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Abstract
The U-curve in euroscepticism is well established: both leftist and rightist populist constituencies
are more eurosceptic than voters for establishment parties. Using rich survey data on a country
with both constituencies represented in parliament (the Netherlands; n=1,296), we examine why
euroscepticism drives populist voting. Our analyses demonstrate that euroscepticism is part of
the well-established link between both 1) distrust in politics and politicians, and 2) support for pro-
tectionism on the one hand, and voting for both types of populist party on the other. It is also part
of the well-known relationship between 3) ethnocentrism and rightist populist voting. Surprisingly,
euroscepticism is not part of the typical association between economic egalitarianism and voting
for a leftist populist party. The concluding section discusses the implications of our ﬁndings and
provides suggestions for further research.
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Introduction
Increasing anti-European sentiment on the right end of the political spectrum profoundly
changed the relationship between the left–right dimension and euroscepticism (Van Elsas
and Van der Brug, 2015; Werts et al., 2012). Once strongly connected to the radical left
and rooted in concerns about economic inequality and the welfare state, today
euroscepticism follows a U-curve. Scepticism is no longer only remarkably strong on
the (economically oriented) left-wing ﬂank, but also on the (culturally focussed) right-
wing ﬂank (Conti and Memoli, 2012; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulou
et al., 2012; Taggart, 1998), due to the rise of right-wing populist parties in the 1990s,
which combine a nationalist and anti-immigrant agenda with high levels of opposition
to the EU (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2004).
While the existence of this U-curve is well-established at the party-level (see, for ex-
ample, Conti and Memoli, 2012; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulou et al.,
2012; Taggart, 1998), two recent studies by Van Elsas and colleagues show that it is mir-
rored among the European population at large (Van Elsas and Van der Brug, 2015; Van
Elsas et al., 2016): citizens who identify as most leftist and most rightist report the highest
levels of euroscepticism. Determining the meaning of this pattern is not straightforward,
however, as it is unclear what the ideological basis of euroscepticism is. As Taggart
(2004, p. 281) argues: ‘populist Euroscepticism is a very broad umbrella covering a most
unusual set of political adversaries’. Moreover, extant studies do not speciﬁcally focus on
leftist and rightist populist constituencies, but instead discern voters based on left–right
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self-placement (Van Elsas and Van der Brug, 2015; Van Elsas et al., 2016). The question
of how euroscepticism among populist constituencies can be understood is, consequently,
still open.
In short, while various studies suggest that opposition towards European integration is
a major electoral selling point for populist parties on the ﬂanks (Taggart, 1998; Werts
et al., 2012), to date there are no studies that ask why the constituencies of these parties
are most sceptical of the EU. In this study, we aim to ﬁll this lacuna by analyzing recent
rich data on political attitudes. We focus on answering the question: how can
euroscepticism as a driver for voting for leftist and rightist populist parties be explained?
While euroscepticism has often been understood as a general disapproval of EU mem-
bership and integration, it is important to take its underlying aspects into account (Hobolt
and De Vries, 2016; cf. Leruth et al., 2018). Based on Lubbers and Scheepers (2010), we
conceptualize euroscepticism as resistance to a reduction of national sovereignty (‘polit-
ical’), a negative evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of EU membership (‘instrumental’),
and/or a low level of identiﬁcation with the EU (‘cultural’). Data collected in 2012 in the
Netherlands provide a closely related measure of euroscepticism and are especially
relevant as a left-wing and a right-wing populist party have been in parliament simulta-
neously in this country since 2006: the Socialist Party (SP) and Geert Wilders’ right-wing
Party for Freedom (PVV), respectively (Akkerman et al., 2017; Otjes and Louwerse,
2015; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013).
The right-wing populist PVV, established in 2006 by Geert Wilders, is well-known for
its national-populism and anti-EU agenda (Vossen, 2011). It acquired 15 out of 150 seats
in parliament in 2012, the year of our data collection (and 20 seats in the most recent par-
liamentary elections, held in 2017). The SP, founded as a Maoist splinter party, gained
electoral success after reinventing itself as a socialist protest party (Lucardie and
Voerman, 2012). It has had seats in the national parliament since 1994, and gained 15
seats in 2012 (and 14 in 2017). Whether the SP can be labelled as populist is subject to
debate. The party’s populist character is primarily seen in how it represents the economic
interests of the ‘common man’ against ‘neo-liberal’ policies and institutions (March,
2011; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015). A recent review of the literature concludes that ‘the
key features of populism – anti-elitism and appeals to popular sovereignty – are still vis-
ible in SP’s rhetoric’ (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015, p. 67), but some argue that ‘populism is
more an auxiliary rhetorical devise than an ideological core attribute’ of the SP (Van
Kessel, 2015, p. 121; cf. March, 2011). Nevertheless, it is still generally considered to
be a populist party (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015).
I. Support for Euroscepticism among Populist Constituencies: Four Explanations
Populism is commonly understood to be a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that is built on a
Manichean view of the world in which there is a ‘pure people’ that suffers the perils
caused by a ‘corrupt elite’ (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 1998, 2004). As there
are diverse interpretations of ‘the people’, populism is easily combined with other, or
‘fuller’, ideologies including those on the left and on the right – explaining why there
is no such thing as ‘the’ populist voter (Rooduijn, 2018). Kriesi (2014) identiﬁes three
conceptions of ‘the people’: a cultural one of ‘the people as a nation’ that is typically as-
sociated with rightist populism, an economic conception of ‘the people as a class’
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associated with leftist populism, and a political conception of ‘the people as sovereign’
which is characteristic of both types of populism. Recent research indicates that the ﬁrst
two are predominantly related to preferences for rightist and leftist populist parties,
respectively, whereas the latter underlies voting for populist parties on both ﬂanks
(Akkerman et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).
Against this background, we scrutinize four possible explanations for support for
euroscepticism among populist constituencies, which are elaborated on below. The ﬁrst
two are explanations that may be valid for both leftist and rightist populist constituencies,
as they may be conceived of as threats to the people as sovereign. These focus on: their
anti-institutional mood (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2014), reﬂected in distrust of political in-
stitutions and politicians (Kemmers et al., 2016); and opposition to international free trade
(Van der Waal and De Koster, 2018). The third explanation matches a conception of the
people as a class and revolves around economic concerns and focuses on opposition to
inequality, such as economic egalitarianism (De Koster et al., 2013; De Vries and
Edwards, 2009). As such, it has potential when it comes to understanding euroscepticism
as a driver for voting for a leftist populist party. The fourth addresses cultural concerns,
reﬂecting a conception of the people as a nation, focusing on opposition to cultural diver-
sity, such as ethnocentrism (De Koster et al., 2013; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Ford
and Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2007), which promises to explain euroscepticism as a driver
for voting for a rightist populist party.
Distrust in Political Institutions and Politicians as a Driver of Euroscepticism
In general, populism is strongly associated with an ‘anti-institutional mood’ (Kemmers
et al., 2016). It leans heavily on the idea that ‘the people’ should effectively hold the
power to rule, but in the current system this is a privilege they lack or, worse, are denied.
Kriesi argues accordingly that the ‘central populist message is that politics has escaped
popular control and that popular control has to be restored’ (2014, p. 363). Consequently,
a general distrust of the political ‘system’ – in particular political parties and politicians,
the ‘elites’ who wrongly hold the power – is central to populism in both its leftist and
rightist guise.
Kriesi (2014) argues that this ‘strong anti-institutional impulse’ is therefore the most
genuine element of populism. According to Canovan (1999, p. 6), populists ‘love trans-
parency and distrust mystiﬁcation’, which means that they ‘denounce backroom deals,
shady compromises, complicated procedures, secret treaties, and technicalities that only
experts can understand’. Canovan further argues that the ‘politics of coalition-building
is evidently open to populist attack on these sorts of grounds, while European Union
politics is a sitting duck’ (1999, p. 6). The latter is true, of course, because supra-national
organizations like the EU make politics seem even less transparent and more of a mystical
‘back-room dealing’ phenomenon, far away from ‘the people’.
In this study, we consequently consider the distrust in political institutions and politi-
cians (henceforward: ‘political distrust’) that is typical of populist constituencies
(Kemmers et al., 2016) as a possible explanation for their euroscepticism. This would
mean that euroscepticism is part of the link between political distrust and support for
those parties. In technical terms, we expect that euroscepticism is a mediator of a positive
effect of political distrust on voting for populist parties (Hypothesis 1).
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Opposition to International Free Trade as a Driver of Euroscepticism
In addition to their opposition to establishment political institutions and politicians, both
leftist and rightist populist parties oppose free trade (henceforward also referred to as
‘support for protectionism’). Support for protectionism can be found among leftist popu-
list parties, such as die Linke (the Left) in Germany, and their rightist counterparts, such as
Front National (National Front) in France. These types of party, for instance, warned
Western European workers that the implementation of the so-called ‘Bolkenstein Direc-
tive’ in 2006 would lead to ‘unfair competition’ from proverbial ‘Polish plumbers’.
In the Netherlands, the leftist populist SP more strongly opposes international free trade
than the rightist populist PVV does. Nevertheless, recent research that focuses on the elec-
torate instead of the party level, demonstrates that opposition to free trade is ﬁerce among
both leftist and rightist populist constituencies, and drives their vote in addition to political
distrust and economic and cultural concerns (Van der Waal and De Koster, 2018). Support
for protectionism is therefore not part of the link between political distrust and support for
populist parties, as one might expect due to the opaque ‘backroom dealing’ and bickering
surrounding free trade negotiations and agreements. Moreover, despite the distributive
consequences of free trade, support for protectionism is not part of the association between
economic egalitarianism and voting for a leftist populist party. Opposition to international
free trade does not, in fact, reﬂect economic concerns, but cultural concerns related to free
trade’s disruption of the national and cultural order (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006;
Margalit, 2012; Van der Waal and De Koster, 2015). Concomitantly, support for protec-
tionism proves to be part of the link between ethnocentrism and voting for a rightist pop-
ulist party, albeit a very minor part (Van der Waal and De Koster, 2018).
Support for protectionism is, thus, largely an independent driver of support for populist
parties. International free trade may be conceived of as a threat to the people’s sover-
eignty. Because the common market is a central pillar of the EU, support for protection-
ism may also underlie euroscepticism. Therefore, we assess whether the greater support
for protectionism among the leftist and rightist populist constituencies is an explanation
for their opposition to the EU. This would mean that euroscepticism is part of the link be-
tween support for protectionism and voting for those parties. Technically, this implies that
euroscepticism is a mediator of a positive effect of support for protectionism on voting for
populist parties (Hypothesis 2).
Opposition to Economic Inequality as a Driver of Euroscepticism
While political distrust and support for protectionism are potential drivers of
euroscepticism among leftist and rightist populist constituencies, economic egalitarianism
is a likely driver of the euroscepticism of the former. The left is traditionally sceptical of
European integration, because this is essentially an economically liberal project that
would allow for more free market exchange, while undermining the sovereignty of states
to implement their own economic policies (Marks and Wilson, 2000; cf. Garry and Tilley,
2015). According to textbook economics, this increases efﬁciency and productivity, but
also aggravates economic inequality. It is the latter that left-wing parties, including pop-
ulist ones (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Van Elsas and Van der
Brug, 2015), traditionally resist. According to Van Elsas and Van der Brug (2015), this is
also why euroscepticism used to have a linear relationship with the left–right dimension,
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with the left being the most and the right being the least sceptical when it comes to Euro-
pean integration.
Among the public at large, the agenda of economic redistribution of leftist parties is
reﬂected in the economic egalitarianism of their supporters, especially those of leftist pop-
ulist parties (De Koster et al., 2013). Their resistance to the EU might therefore be in-
spired by their opposition to the inequality inducing character of the European common
market, and thus by their economic egalitarianism. If so, euroscepticism is part of the link
between economic egalitarianism and support for leftist populist parties. Technically, this
would mean that euroscepticism is a mediator of a positive effect of economic egalitari-
anism on voting for a leftist populist party (Hypothesis 3).
Opposition to Cultural Diversity as a Driver of Euroscepticism
The previous section identiﬁed the euroscepticism of leftist populist constituencies as pos-
sibly pertaining to the classical economic cleavage in politics. Right-wing populist
parties, on the other hand, are often considered to reﬂect the emergence of a new cultural
cleavage, centering on issues of identity, nationalism and immigration, instead of eco-
nomic redistribution (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2012; Kriesi et al., 2008). They are most op-
posed to cultural diversity in order to protect a virtuous ‘people’ from the inﬂuences of so-
called ‘outsiders’. It may very well be that the euroscepticism of the rightist populist con-
stituency is also due to these concerns over increasing cultural and ethnic diversity, as Eu-
ropean integration means less leeway for nation states concerning international migration,
while immigration ﬂows may be perceived as a threat to national identity (Stockemer,
2016; Toshkov and Kortenska, 2015).
Right-wing populist parties have proved successful in mobilizing their electorates by
opposing immigration and cultural and ethnic diversity (De Vries and Edwards, 2009;
Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2007). Moreover, ethnocentrism, a key indicator for
this opposition, has proved to be the most prominent driver of support for those parties
(Akkerman et al., 2017; De Koster et al., 2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).
The euroscepticism of rightist populist constituencies might therefore reﬂect their opposi-
tion to cultural diversity. In that case, euroscepticism is part of the link between ethnocen-
trism and support for rightist populist parties. Technically, this would mean that
euroscepticism is a mediator of a positive effect of ethnocentrism on voting for a rightist
populist party (Hypothesis 4).
II. Data and Measures
Our data (Achterberg et al., 2012) were collected in 2012 through CentERdata, a research
institute that carefully maintains a panel representative of the Dutch population aged 16
years and over. 1,707 individuals were invited to complete the survey, and 1,302 did
so. The response rate of 76.2% is somewhat higher than the 2012 wave of the bi-annual
Cultural Change in the Netherlands survey (Coumans and Knops, 2012), and comparable
to the 2012 wave of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (Oudejans, 2013). We
removed six respondents who took less than the minimum time reasonably needed to
complete the survey (10minutes), leaving a dataset of 1,296.
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We measured voting behaviour in three categories by using the question of which
party the respondents would vote for if elections for the national parliament were to be
held tomorrow. We coded those preferring the SP as a vote for the populist left and those
opting for the PVV and splinter parties Democratisch Politiek Keerpunt (DPK; Demo-
cratic Political Turning Point) and Trots op Nederland (TON; Proud of the
Netherlands) as a vote for the populist right. The category of reference, vote for non-
populist parties, includes respondents favouring centrist, small Christian and new-leftist
parties. The three main centre parties are: Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, Labour Party),
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD; Liberal Conservatives) and Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA; Christian Democrats). The smaller Christian parties are:
ChristenUnie (CU; ChristianUnion) and Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP; Re-
formed Political Party), while the new-leftist parties are Democraten 66 (D66; Liberal
Democrats) and GroenLinks (GL; Green Left). As a ﬁrst robustness check, we also per-
formed the analyses with a narrower deﬁnition of vote for non-populist parties, limiting
this category to respondents who voted for one of the main centre parties (PvdA, VVD
and CDA).
Respondents preferring the splinter parties Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD; Party for the
Animals, n=12) and 50Plus (50+; Party for the Elderly, n=13) are hard to classify in the
three categories described above, and were consequently coded as missing. Respondents
who indicated they ‘don’t know yet’ (n=201), ‘would not vote’ (n=30), are ‘not allowed
to vote’ (n=16), or ‘won’t say’ (n=14) were also coded as missing.
Our measure for the mediating variable Euroscepticism includes items that cover
euroscepticism’s three sub-dimensions (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). Political
euroscepticism is captured by the ﬁrst item: ‘Some people say that the European Union
should have more inﬂuence on various policy areas. To what extent do you agree or dis-
agree with them?’ Response categories range from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly
agree’.‡ Instrumental euroscepticism is tapped by items two and three: ‘Generally speak-
ing, Dutch membership of the European Union is [1 ‘a good thing’; 2 ‘a bad thing’; 3
‘neither a good nor a bad thing’]’ and ‘Some people say that the Netherlands substantially
beneﬁts from its membership of the European Union. Do you agree or disagree with
them?’ (response categories range from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’). The
cultural dimension, non-identiﬁcation with the EU, is covered by the fourth item: ‘In
the near future, do you see yourself as: 1 ‘predominantly Dutch’, 2 ‘ﬁrst Dutch, then
European’, 3 ‘just as much Dutch as European’, 4 ‘ﬁrst European, then Dutch’, 5
‘predominantly European”. These items were coded so that higher scores indicate higher
levels of euroscepticism, with a range of 1–5, and can be combined into an overall
euroscepticism measure. A factor analysis indicated that there is a ﬁrst factor with an
Eigenvalue of 2.44, which explains 61.1 per cent of the variance. We created a reliable
scale for euroscepticism (Cronbach’s α = 0.78) by calculating the mean score for respon-
dents with valid answers to at least three of the four items.
We measured economic egalitarianism by means of items used in previous research
in the Dutch context (see, for example, De Koster et al., 2013; Van der Waal and De
Koster, 2018):
‡All ﬁve-point Likert items used in our measures also included the answer category ‘don’t know’, which was coded as miss-
ing in all cases.
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1. The state should raise social beneﬁts.
2. There is no longer any real poverty in the Netherlands.
3. Large income differences are unfair because everyone is essentially equal.
4. Companies should be obliged to allow their employees to share the proﬁts.
Response categories range from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’. After re-
verse coding the second item, a factor analysis indicated that a ﬁrst factor with an Eigen-
value of 1.95 explains 48.8 per cent of the variance. We constructed a scale for economic
egalitarianism (Cronbach’s α = 0.64) by calculating the mean score for the respondents
who had valid scores on at least three of the four items. Given the moderate reliability,
we performed a second robustness check, consisting of four analyses that each used
one separate item for economic egalitarianism instead of the multi-item scale.
Support for protectionism was measured by means of a commonly used item on the
favourability of import limitations (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), which has also been
used in the Dutch context (Van der Waal and De Koster, 2015, 2018). Its response cate-
gories are: 1) strongly favour; 2) favour; 3) neutral; 4) oppose; 5) strongly oppose. It
reads: ‘Some people have suggested that the Dutch government should limit imports in
order to protect jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and would
hurt Dutch exports. Do you favour or oppose import limitations?’
Ethnocentrism was measured using six items indicating negative prejudice towards
outgroups taken from Eisinga and Scheepers (1989) and recently used in the
Netherlands (see Van der Waal and De Koster, 2015, 2018).
1. Foreigners carry all kinds of dirty smells around.
2. With Moroccans you never know for certain whether or not they are going to be
aggressive.
3. Most people from Surinam work quite slowly.
4. Most Turks are rather self-indulgent at work.
5. Foreigners living in the Netherlands should adapt to Dutch uses and customs.
6. The Netherlands should have never let foreign guest workers in.
A factor analysis showed that a ﬁrst factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.72 explains 62.1
per cent of the variance. We created a scale for ethnocentrism (Cronbach’s α = 0.87)
by calculating the mean score for the respondents who had valid scores on at least four
of the six items.
We measured political distrust by means of three items previously used in the
Netherlands (Van der Waal and De Koster, 2018). The ﬁrst and second items respectively
inquire as to what extent the respondents trust politicians and politics (response categories
range from 1 ‘absolutely no trust’ to 5 ‘certainly a lot of trust’). The third asks to what
extent they agree with the statement that ‘politicians seldom speak the truth’ (response
categories range from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’). A factor analysis
yielded a ﬁrst factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.39, which explains 80 per cent of the vari-
ance. We created a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.87) by calculating the mean score for
respondents without missing values on these items.
We also included various controls. Age was measured in years and gender was coded
‘0’ for males and ‘1’ for females. The variable non-native was coded ‘0’ for the
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respondents of whom both parents were born in the Netherlands and ‘1’ for others. Edu-
cation was measured as the number of years required to attain one’s highest level of ed-
ucation, ranging from 8 (only primary education) to 18 (university degree). Net household
income was measured in thousands of Euros per month. Labour-market position was
measured by means of four dummy variables: 1) not in the labour market (retired, student,
housekeeping or disabled); 2) employed; 3) partially employed; 4) unemployed. Religious
denomination was also measured with four dummies: 1) no religious denomination; 2)
Protestant; 3) Catholic; 4) other religious denomination. Attendance at religious services
was measured with three dummies: 1) no attendance at religious services; 2) occasional
attendance at religious services (ranging from less than once a year to once a month);
3) frequent attendance at religious services (once a week or more frequent).
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics.
III. Results
Prior to testing our hypotheses, we explored how euroscepticism is related to the well-
established drivers of populist voting addressed in the theoretical section. Table 2
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Range n
Voting behaviour
Vote for non-populist parties (ref.)
Vote for populist left 0.17 0-1 980
Vote for populist right 0.06 0-1 980
Euroscepticism 2.96 0.87 1-5 1,256
Political distrust 3.24 0.90 1-5 1,243
Support for protectionism 2.32 0.87 1-5 1,126
Economic egalitarianism 3.24 0.70 1-5 1,259
Ethnocentrism 2.57 0.78 1-5 1,213
Gender (female) 0.44 0-1 1,296
Age 56.63 15.24 16-90 1,296
Non-native 0.08 0-1 1,274
Education 14.50 2.75 8-18 1,295
Net household income (in thousand euros) 2.65 1.39 0-13.73 1,295
Labour-market position
Not in labour market (ref.)
Employed 0.47 0-1 1,271
Partially employed 0.02 0-1 1,271
Unemployed 0.06 0-1 1,271
Religious denomination
No religious denomination (ref.)
Protestant 0.21 0-1 1,296
Catholic 0.28 0-1 1,296
Other religious denomination 0.06 0-1 1,296
Attendance at religious services
No attendance at religious services (ref.)
Occasional attendance at religious services 0.32 0-1 1,280
Frequent attendance at religious services 0.13 0-1 1,280
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demonstrates substantial correlations with political distrust, support for protectionism and
ethnocentrism, suggesting that all three could be relevant for understanding the
euroscepticism of populist electorates. Economic egalitarianism seems to be a less likely
candidate, as it is only modestly related to euroscepticism.
Table 3 compares the level of euroscepticism and other potential drivers of populist
voting across the three categories of voter: non-populist party constituency (column
(1)), left-wing populist constituency (column (2)), and right-wing populist party constitu-
ency (column (3)).
The ﬁrst three rows demonstrate that, in line with our theorizing, both of the populist
constituencies report higher levels of euroscepticism, political distrust and support for
protectionism than the non-populist constituency. In each case, it is the right-wing popu-
list constituency in particular that stands out: it is most eurosceptic, most distrustful of
politics, and most strongly in support of protectionism – it is only in the latter case that
the difference with the left-wing populist constituency is not signiﬁcant. Turning to eco-
nomic and cultural concerns, Table 3 reveals that the two types of populist constituency
differ vis-à-vis the non-populist constituency, in line with our theorizing. The leftist pop-
ulist constituency is more economically egalitarian than voters for non-populist parties,
but not signiﬁcantly more ethnocentric. Among the rightist populist constituency, this pat-
tern is reversed: it is more ethnocentric than voters for non-populist parties, but just as
economically egalitarian.
Having established these descriptive ﬁndings, we turned to testing our hypotheses,
conducting two types of analysis, which we will discuss consecutively. First, we per-
formed multivariate multinomial regression analyses, presented in Table 4, which esti-
mated the role of all the drivers of populist voting behaviour, while also including the
Table 2: Zero-order Correlations between Potential Drivers of Voting for Populist Parties and
Euroscepticism
r n
Political distrust 0.40*** 1,226
Support for protectionism 0.31*** 1,115
Economic egalitarianism 0.09** 1,236
Ethnocentrism 0.41*** 1,191
Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3: Mean scores of Euroscepticism and other Potential Drivers of Voting for Populist Parties
Non-populist party
constituency
Left-wing populist party
constituency
Right-wing populist party
constituency
n
Euroscepticism 2.68 3.23*** 3.97*** 971
Political distrust 2.97 3.54*** 4.08*** 961
Support for protectionism 2.18 2.51*** 2.72*** 889
Economic egalitarianism 3.11 3.67*** 3.18 968
Ethnocentrism 2.45 2.52 3.44*** 938
Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (left-wing and right-wing populist constituencies compared to non-populist
party constituency; signiﬁcance levels apply both with and without Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).
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control variables. As a result of the rescaling that occurs in each separate model in logistic
regression analyses, coefﬁcients cannot simply be compared between the models in
Table 4 (Breen et al., 2013). The analyses in Table 4 do not therefore sufﬁce when it
comes to testing the hypothesized mediating effect of euroscepticism. Therefore, we also
applied a decomposition analysis using the KHB method (Breen et al., 2013), which was
speciﬁcally designed to correct for this characteristic of logistic regression analyses. This
decomposition analysis uncovered to what extent euroscepticism mediates the effects of
political distrust (Hypothesis 1), support for protectionism (Hypothesis 2), economic egal-
itarianism (Hypothesis 3) and ethnocentrism (Hypothesis 4) on voting behaviour. Table 5
presents the results.
Model 1 in Table 4 reports ﬁndings in line with those in Table 3: political distrust and
support for protectionism drive voting for both types of populist party, while economic
egalitarianism only does so for the leftist type and ethnocentrism only for the rightist type
of populist party. Model 2 demonstrates that euroscepticism also drives voting for both
types of populist party, while Model 3 reveals that it does so in addition to the drivers al-
ready included in Model 1. At ﬁrst sight, the declining strength of the coefﬁcients com-
pared to Model 1 may suggest that euroscepticism is a mediator, as hypothesized.
However, the rescaling between the models implies that this inference cannot be made.
The decomposition analysis presented in Table 5 seeks to answer the question of
whether euroscepticism really mediates the effects of political distrust, support for protec-
tionism, economic egalitarianism and ethnocentrism. The ﬁrst row of Table 5 shows the
strength of the initial association between the drivers of populist voting before
euroscepticism was added to the model (slightly different than in Model 1 in Table 4, be-
cause of the corrections applied by the KHB method). The second row shows the strength
of their association after euroscepticism was included. The ﬁrst three columns focus on
the three signiﬁcant drivers of voting for a leftist populist party: political distrust, support
for protectionism and economic egalitarianism, respectively. The last three columns focus
on the signiﬁcant drivers of voting for a rightist populist party: political distrust, support
for protectionism and ethnocentrism.
The third and fourth rows in Table 5 reveal that ﬁve out of six of those drivers are sig-
niﬁcantly mediated by euroscepticism. As expected, euroscepticism mediates the link be-
tween political distrust and voting for a leftist (column (1)) and rightist (column (4))
populist party, for 27 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively. This corroborates Hypothesis
1. Hypothesis 2 is also corroborated, as columns (2) and (5) demonstrate that
euroscepticism mediates the link between support for protectionism and voting for those
parties by 20 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. In contrast, Hypothesis 3 must be
rejected, as euroscepticism does not mediate the link between economic egalitarianism
and voting for a leftist populist party. Euroscepticism does, however, mediate the link be-
tween ethnocentrism and voting for a rightist populist party by 26 per cent, corroborating
Hypothesis 4.
We conducted two robustness checks, which both led to the same conclusions about
the tenability of our hypotheses as the main analyses. In the ﬁrst check, the category of
reference – vote for non-populist parties – was limited to respondents who voted for
the three main centre parties (PvdA, VVD and CDA). In that case, euroscepticism medi-
ates the effect of political distrust on voting for a leftist populist party by 27 per cent
(p<0.001) and voting for a rightist populist party by 24 per cent (p<0.001). It mediates
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the effect of support for protectionism on voting for those two parties by 19 per cent
(p=0.018) and 19 per cent (p=0.014), respectively. Similar to the main analyses, the ﬁrst
robustness check also demonstrates that the link between economic egalitarianism and
voting for a leftist populist party is not signiﬁcantly mediated by euroscepticism
(p=0.167), while the link between ethnocentrism and voting for a rightist populist party
is mediated by 31 per cent (p=0.001).§
We conducted four analyses for the second robustness check, one for each separate
item for economic egalitarianism instead of the multi-item scale. These analyses also
corroborate Hypothesis 1 (euroscepticism mediates the positive link between political
distrust and voting for a populist party), Hypothesis 2 (euroscepticism mediates the
positive link between support for protectionism and voting for a populist party), and
Hypothesis 4 (euroscepticism mediates the positive link between ethnocentrism and
voting for a rightist populist party). Just like the main analyses, they also indicate that
Hypothesis 3 (euroscepticism mediates the positive link between economic egalitarianism
and voting for a leftist populist party) must be rejected.
Conclusion and Discussion
Populist parties on both ﬂanks of the political spectrum are most negative about the EU
(Conti and Memoli, 2012; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012).
Our study on the Dutch case shows that this U-curve in euroscepticism also exists among
the constituencies of these parties, which resembles recent ﬁndings that citizens who
identify themselves at the poles of the left–right axis are most eurosceptic (Van Elsas
and Van der Brug, 2015; Van Elsas et al., 2016). Our main goal was to discover why pop-
ulist constituencies are eurosceptic. Our ﬁndings point at differences as well as substantial
similarities between leftist and rightist populist constituencies.
Starting with the similarities, there are well-established links between, on the one hand,
political distrust (Kemmers et al., 2016) and support for protectionism (Van der Waal and
De Koster, 2018), and, on the other, voting for rightist and leftist populist parties. This
study demonstrates that the euroscepticism of those populist constituencies is part of both
of these well-known links. The two types of populist constituency are, thus, more wary of
the EU than voters for establishment parties, because they have lower trust in its institu-
tions and politicians, and are more opposed to its common market. The relevance of
political distrust indicates that the euroscepticism of populist constituencies substantially
reﬂects their anti-institutional impulse, independent of left–right ideology (cf. Canovan,
1999; Kemmers et al., 2016; Kriesi, 2014; Serricchio et al., 2013), representing opposi-
tion to institutions perceived as opaque, overtly technical, complicated and undemocratic
(Canovan, 1999).
Turning to the differences, our study replicated earlier research in demonstrating that
economic egalitarianism drives voting for a leftist populist party and not for a rightist
§A referee suggested comparing the two populist constituencies with respondents whose voting behaviour was coded as
missing in our main analyses because they responded ‘don’t know yet’, ‘would not vote’ or ‘won’t say’. Compared to this
rather heterogeneous group, supporters of leftist populist parties are more economically egalitarian (p<0.0005), but
euroscepticism does not mediate this link (p=0.699). Supporters of rightist populist parties display more political distrust
(p=0.010) and ethnocentrism (p<0.0005) than this group, and euroscepticism mediates these links by 28 per cent
(p=0.022) and 12 per cent (p=0.022), respectively.
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one, while ethnocentrism drives the vote for a rightist populist party and not a leftist one
(cf. Akkerman et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Nevertheless, while
euroscepticism proved to be part of the latter link, it does not play a role in the former,
indicating that euroscepticism is not driven by economic concerns.
Our ﬁndings on the role of opposition to international free trade when it comes to
euroscepticism point in the same direction. Euroscepticism proves to be part of the link
between support for protectionism and voting for populist parties at both ends of the po-
litical spectrum, while support for protectionism is not motivated by voters’ economic
concerns (cf. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Margalit, 2012; Van der Waal and De
Koster, 2015). Populist constituencies’ resistance to the EU certainly partly reﬂects ‘eco-
nomically protectionist EU opposition’ (Van Elsas and Van der Brug, 2015, p. 199), but
this opposition to the European common market is not inspired by fears over its distribu-
tive consequences, although this is the core assumption in theorizing on the
euroscepticism of, in particular, leftist constituencies, and the role of egocentric utilitari-
anism therein (cf. Serricchio et al., 2013, p. 53).
The question is, of course, whether our ﬁndings result from our focus on the Dutch
case. Our conclusion that economic concerns do not explain euroscepticism among Dutch
leftist populist constituencies resembles the previously reported low salience of those
concerns for opposing the EU among the Dutch population in general (Startin and
Krouwel, 2013). It may thus be a Dutch particularity, especially because the
Netherlands has experienced relatively weak effects of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis
(Akkerman et al., 2017, p. 384). It is possible that things are different in (mostly South-
ern) European countries in which this crisis had more severe effects. On the other hand,
our ﬁndings are in line with those of Serricchio et al., (2013), who, in a study of more than
two dozen countries, found that economic concerns played a marginal role in explaining
euroscepticism, even during the global ﬁnancial crisis and its aftermath. They instead
found that cultural concerns and anti-institutionalism were crucial drivers of
euroscepticism, which resembles our results. Again, however, these factors may not be
equally relevant throughout Europe: it is possible that in countries with the largest inﬂux
of refugees and in which the politicization of the ‘migration crisis’ has been most outspo-
ken, ethnocentrism and political distrust are even more closely related to euroscepticism
and populist voting behaviour than in the Dutch case.
Finally, our ﬁndings may inspire further research. First, given our focus on a single na-
tional case, it is worthwhile to assess in cross-national studies how country characteristics
such as the impacts of the economic and migration crises shape the mechanisms scruti-
nized here. Second, in so doing research would beneﬁt from including a measure for pop-
ulist attitudes (for example, Akkerman et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018)
alongside the indicators used in our study. That would enable scholars to analyze whether
the mechanisms discussed here simply result from a match between the policy stances of
populist parties on the one hand and citizens’ attitudes related to economic inequality,
cultural diversity, free trade and political trust on the other, or that a preference for a
populist notion of politics weighs in as well.
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